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Recently, Yan and Gao proposed a quantum secret sharing protocol between multiparty (m mem-
bers in group 1) and multiparty (n members in group 2) using a sequence of single photons (Phys.
Rev. A 72, 012304 (2005)). We find that it is secure if the quantum signal transmitted is only
a single photon but insecure with a multi-photon signal as some agents can get the information
about the others’ message if they attack the communication with a Trojan horse. However, security
against this attack can be attained with a simple modification.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
In general, secret sharing [1] is used to split a mes-
sage (MA) into several pieces which are distributed to
several agents. When the agents collaborate, they can
obtain the message, otherwise they can get nothing.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is the generalization of
classical secret sharing into quantum scenario and be-
comes an important branch of quantum communica-
tion. It provides a secure way for not only creating
a private key among several users [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
but also splitting a piece of classical secret message
or quantum information (an unknown quantum state)
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. It has progressed
quickly since Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume [2] proposed
the original QSS protocol using a three-photon entangled
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states, and attracts a lot of
attentions in recent years [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Recently, Yan and Gao [19] presented a novel concept
for quantum secret sharing of classical information (a pri-
vate key), i.e., QSS between group 1 and group 2 with
polarized single photons. It is secure if the quantum sig-
nal transmitted is only a single photon but insecure with
a multi-photon signal as some agents can get the infor-
mation about the others’ message if they attack the com-
munication with a Trojan horse. In this paper, we will
discuss this attack and improve the security of Yan-Gao
QSS protocol against this attack with a little of modifi-
cation.
The basic idea of Yan-Gao QSS protocol [19] can be
described as follows. The members of group 1 are Alice 1,
Alice 2,..., and Alice m, and those for group 2 are Bob 1,
Bob 2, ..., and Bob n. Group 1 wants to share a private
key with group 2 in such a way that the key can be read
out only when all members in each group cooperate. This
task can be completed with six steps as follows.
(1) Alice 1 generates two random binary strings A1 and
B1 whose length is nN bits. She also prepares nN qubits
and divides it into to n pieces. Each piece contains N
qubits. Each qubit is in one of the four states
|ψ00〉 = |0〉, (1)
|ψ10〉 = |1〉, (2)
|ψ01〉 = |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), (3)
|ψ11〉 = |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (4)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the two eigenvectors of the operator
σz (called it the measuring basis (MB) Z), and |+〉 and
|−〉 are those of the operator σx. That is, Alice 1 prepares
the qubits according to the bit values in A1 and B1. The
four states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉 correspond to the codes
00, 10, 01, and 11, respectively. The first bit in each
code comes from the A1 and represents the information
of the eigenvalue correlated to the state, and the second
bit comes from the B1 and represents the MB of the state,
i.e., the state is the eigenvector of Z if the second bit is
0, otherwise the state is the eigenvector of X . Alice 1
sends the nN qubits to Alice 2.
(2) Similar to Alice 1, Alice 2 creates two random bi-
nary strings A2 and B2. She operates each of the nN
qubits according to the bits in the two strings in turn,
i.e., if the bit in A2 is 0, she performs the unitary op-
eration I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| on the qubit, otherwise she
performs the unitary operation U = iσy = |0〉〈1|− |1〉〈0|.
Simultaneously she has to operate the qubit according
2to the bit in B2. That is, if the bit in B2 is 0, she sup-
plies the unitary operation I on the qubit, otherwise she
performs a Hadamard (H ) operator on it. After the two
operations on each qubit, Alice 2 sends the nN qubits to
Alice 3.
The nice feature of the operation U is that it flips the
state in both measuring bases [4, 22, 23], i.e.,
U |0〉 = −|1〉, U |1〉 = |0〉, (5)
U |+〉 = |−〉, U |−〉 = −|+〉. (6)
The H operation can transfer the states between the two
MBs, Z and X [12, 13], i.e.,
H |0〉 = |+〉, H |1〉 = |−〉, (7)
H |+〉 = |0〉, H |−〉 = |1〉. (8)
After the two operations done by Alice 2, the photon
is randomly in one of the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉},
which will prevent Alice 1 from eavesdropping freely if
there is one photon in each signal.
(3) Alice i operates the qubits like Alice 2, i =
3, 4, . . . ,m.
(4) Alice m sends N qubits to each member of group
2, Bob j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in turn. After they receive the
qubits, the members of group 1 publicly announce the
strings B1, B2, . . ., and Bm, which will reveal the infor-
mation about the MB of each qubit operated by Alice i
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m).
(5) Bob j measures each of his qubits with MB Z or X
according to the XOR (i.e., ⊕) results of corresponding
bits in the strings B1, B2, . . ., and Bm.
(6) All members in group 1 check eavesdropping of this
quantum communication. If the channel is secure, the
XOR results of Bob j’s corresponding bits can be used
as key bits for secret sharing.
Yan-Gao protocol may be secure for each member in
group 2, say Bob j, as group 1 can detect the eavesdrop-
ping done by them, as the same as BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol [24]. But the eavesdropping done
by some members in group 1 is difficult to be detected,
in particular some agents in group 1 eavesdrop the com-
munication with a multi-photon signal. We will discuss
the security of Yan-Gao protocol and present a possible
improvement of Yan-Gao protocol security.
The attack done by Alice 1 with a Trojan horse works
as follows. She prepares two photons in the same state
and sends them to Alice 2. After operations have been
done by the other members in group 1, Alice 1 intercepts
the signal and separates a photon from the signal with
a photon number splitter (PNS: 50/50). She sends the
other one in each signal to the members in group 2. After
Alice i (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) announces the strings B1, B2, . . .,
and Bm, Alice 1 can obtain the key freely without the
help of the others in group 1. It means that Yan-Gao
protocol is not secure for Alice 1. Of course, an eaves-
dropper, Eve (who can be any one of Alice 2, Alice 3,
..., Alice m) can steal almost all the information about
the unitary operation done by any member in group 1
with a multi-photon Trojan horse attack except for Alice
1, as the same as that in Ref. [13]. That is, Eve inter-
cepts the original signal and sends Alice i 2K+1 photons
in the same state, say φ0 = |0〉. After the operation is
done by Alice i, Eve intercepts the photons and measures
with two MBs after splitting it using some PNSs. In de-
tail, Eve measures half of the photons with MB Z, and
the others with MB X . The effect of the two operations
{I, U} according to Ai and {I,H} corresponding to Bi
done by Alice i is equivalent to one of the four opera-
tions {I, U,H, H¯} chosen according to the two bits from
Ai and Bi. Here H¯ =
1√
2
(−|0〉〈0|+|0〉〈1|+|1〉〈0|+|1〉〈1|).
The task of the eavesdropping done by Eve is simplified
to distinguish the four unitary operations. However, they
can be distinguished with sufficiently enough photons. If
Alice i performs one of the two operations {I, U} on the
fake signal, the outcomes of the measurements on the
2K photons with MB Z are the same one, otherwise the
outcomes are different. The same result can be obtained
with the measurements on the other 2K photons with MB
X if Alice i performs one of the two operations {H, H¯} on
the fake signal. Thus, quantum secret sharing between
m members and n members turns into that between t
members (t < m) and n members. However, since Alice
1 keep A1 in secret and Eve can not get the informa-
tion A1 of Alice 1, so two groups still share a secure key.
In a word, Yan-Gao protocol is not secure only if Alice
1 replaces the single-photon signal with a multi-photon
one.
In essence, the attack comes from the two facts: one is
that the member in group 1 does not determine whether
there is one photon in each quantum signal received
or more; the other is that the member does not know
whether an eavesdropper intercepts the original signal.
For improving the security of Yan-Gao protocol [19], a
photon number splitter (PNS: 50/50) and single-photon
measurements are necessary for each of the members in
group 1, as the same as that in Ref. [13], except for
Alice 1, the one who prepares the original signal. The
measurements with a PNS is shown in Fig.1. That is,
Alice l chooses randomly a sufficiently enough subset of
the nN photons as the samples for eavesdropping check,
and measures each sample with a PNS and two single-
photon detectors after the original quantum signals are
transmitted from Alice l− 1 to her, see Fig.1.
For the integrity, let us describe all the steps of this
modified Yan-Gao protocol as follows, including some
steps same as those in the original one [19].
(M1) Same as the first step in the original Yan-Gao
protocol, Alice 1 prepares nN qubits and each qubit is in
one of the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} according to the
bits in the two binary strings A1 and B1. She sends the
qubits to Alice 2.
(M2) Similar to Alice 1, Alice 2 create two binary
strings A2 and B2. For each of the nN qubits, she per-
forms the operation I (U) on it if the corresponding bit
in A1 is 0 (1). Simultaneously she has to operate the
qubit with I or H according to the corresponding bit in
3detector 1
detector 2 
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The measurements with a photon
number splitter (PNS: 50/50), similar to that in Ref. [13].
The members in group 1 choose one of the two MBs, Z and
X, randomly to measure each signal after the PNS.
B2 is 0 or 1, respectively. She sends the photons to Alice
3.
Certainly, before Alice 2 operates the nN photons, she
chooses randomly a sufficiently enough subset of photons
as the samples for eavesdropping check. First, she splits
each sample signal with a PNS, and then measures each
signal with the MB Z or X choosing randomly, shown
in Fig.1. Moreover, she should analyze the error rate εs
of the samples by means that she requires Alice 1 to tell
her the original states of the samples. If the error rate is
reasonably lower than the threshold εt, Alice 2 continues
the quantum communication to next step, otherwise she
aborts it.
(M3) Alice i operates the qubits like Alice 2, i =
3, 4, . . . ,m. For analyzing the error rate of the samples,
she requires all the members before her to tell her the
original state or the operations they chose.
(M4) Alice m sends N qubits to each member in group
2, Bob j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in turn. After they receive their
qubits, the members in group 1 publicly announce the
strings B1, B2, . . . , Bm.
(M5) Bob j measures each of his qubits with the MB
Z or X according to the XOR (i.e., ⊕) results of corre-
sponding bits in the strings B1, B2, . . . , Bm.
(M6) All members in group 1 complete the error rate
analysis of the transmission between the two groups. To
this end, all Alice require each of the member in group
2 to publish a subset of results chosen randomly, and
analyze the error rates of the samples. If the channel is
secure, the XOR results of Bob j’s corresponding bits can
be used as key bits for secret sharing, otherwise they dis-
card the results obtained and repeat the quantum com-
munication from the beginning.
In fact, this modified Yan-Gao protocol is secure with
just a little of modification of the original Yan-Gao proto-
col [19]. That is, each of the members in group 1 performs
an eavesdropping check for the transmission of the qubits
with a PNS and two single-photon detectors. The prin-
ciple of the eavesdropping checks is the same as that in
BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [24, 25]. So the
transmission of qubits between two authorized members
in the two groups is secure.
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